Culley v. Marshall, 601 U.S. ___ (2024) (2024)

NOTICE: This opinion is subject toformal revision before publication in the United States Reports.Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, SupremeCourt of the United States, Washington, D.C. 20543,pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formalerrors.SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES_________________No. 22–585_________________HALIMA TARIFFA CULLEY, etal.,PETITIONERS v. STEVEN T. MARSHALL, ATTORNEY GENERAL OFALABAMA, etal.on writ of certiorari to the united statescourt of appeals for the eleventh circuit[May 9, 2024]Justice Kavanaugh delivered the opinion of theCourt.When police seize and then seek civil forfeitureof a car that was used to commit a drug offense, the Constitutionrequires a timely forfeiture hearing. The question here is whetherthe Constitution also requires a separate preliminary hearing todetermine whether the police may retain the car pending theforfeiture hearing. This Court’s precedents establish that theanswer is no: The Constitution requires a timely forfeiturehearing; the Constitution does not also require a separatepreliminary hearing.IHalima Culley loaned her car to hercollege-aged son. On February 17, 2019, police officers in Satsuma,Alabama, stopped the car while the son was driving, and theofficers discovered marijuana and a loaded handgun in the car. Theofficers arrested Culley’s son and charged him with possessingmarijuana. The officers also seized the car incident to thearrest.At about the same time in 2019, Lena Suttonloaned her car to a friend. On February 21, 2019, police officersin Leesburg, Alabama, stopped the car while Sutton’s friend wasdriving, and the officers discovered a large amount ofmethamphetamine in the car. The officers arrested Sutton’s friendand charged him with trafficking methamphetamine and possessingdrug paraphernalia. The officers also seized the car incident tothe arrest.At the time of the seizures of the two cars,Alabama law authorized the civil forfeiture of a car used to commitor facilitate a drug crime. See Ala. Code §20–2–93(a)(5) (2015).Officers could seize the car “incident to an arrest” so long as theState then “promptly” initiated a forfeiture case. §20–2–93(b)(1),(c). In the interim before the forfeiture hearing, the car’s ownercould recover it by posting bond at double the car’s value. See§20–2–93(h); §28–4–287 (2013). At the forfeiture hearing, the ownercould prevail and recover the car under Alabama’s “affirmativedefense” for “innocent owners of property subject to forfeiture.”Wallace v. State, 229 So. 3d 1108, 1110 (Ala. Civ.App. 2017). That defense required the owner to show that the ownerlacked knowledge of the car’s connection to the drug crime. SeeAla. Code §20–2–93(h) (2015).The State of Alabama filed a forfeiturecomplaint against Culley’s car on February 27, 2019, just 10 daysafter the seizure of the car. But Culley waited six months beforeanswering that complaint. And she waited another year—untilSeptember 21, 2020—before raising an innocent owner defense in amotion for summary judgment. Soon thereafter, on October 30, 2020,an Alabama state court granted Culley’s motion and ordered thereturn of her car.Sutton similarly moved slowly in her forfeitureproceeding. Alabama brought a forfeiture case against Sutton’s caron March 6, 2019, just 13 days after the seizure of the car. Suttoninitially failed to appear in the case, causing the state court toenter a default judgment for Alabama. Sutton later requested thatthe state court set aside that judgment, and the state court didso. Sutton then submitted a brief answer and served discoveryrequests on Alabama, but Sutton otherwise took no action until thestate court set a date for the forfeiture trial. On April 10, 2020,three weeks before the scheduled trial date, Sutton finally movedfor summary judgment on the ground that she was an innocent owner.Soon thereafter, on May 28, 2020, the state court granted hermotion, and she recovered her car.While those forfeiture cases were ongoing,Culley and Sutton filed purported class-action complaints infederal court. Culley sued in the U.S. District Court for theSouthern District of Alabama. Sutton sued in the U.S.District Court for the Northern District of Alabama. Both soughtmoney damages under 42 U.S.C. §1983, claiming that thestate officials violated their due process rights by retainingtheir cars during the forfeiture process without holdingpreliminary hearings. Culley and Sutton argued that a preliminaryhearing (also referred to as a retention hearing) is required underthe Mathews v. Eldridge due process test, whichbalances the private interests at stake, the value of addedprocedures, and the burdens on the government from the addedprocedures. See 424U.S. 319, 334–335 (1976).The District Court for the Southern District ofAlabama dismissed Culley’s complaint. Culley v.Marshall, Civ. Action No. 19–701 (Sept. 29, 2021), App. toPet. for Cert. 58a. Relying on this Court’s decisions in UnitedStates v. $8,850, 461 U.S.555 (1983), and United States v. Von Neumann,474 U.S.242 (1986), the District Court held that due process requires atimely forfeiture hearing but not a separate preliminary hearing.See App. to Pet. for Cert. 44a–46a. The District Court thenassessed the timeliness of Culley’s forfeiture hearing under thefour-factor test set forth in $8,850, which looks to(i)the length of the delay of the forfeiture hearing,(ii)the reason for the delay, (iii)whether the claimantrequested a timely hearing, and (iv)whether the delay wasprejudicial. See id., at 46a–47a (citing $8,850, 461U.S., at 563–565). The District Court concluded that Culley’sforfeiture hearing was timely under those factors because sheplayed a “significant role” in delaying her own case. App. to Pet.for Cert. 47a.The District Court for the Northern District ofAlabama similarly entered summary judgment against Sutton on herdue process claim. Sutton v. Leesburg, Civ. ActionNo. 20–91 (Sept. 13, 2021), App. to Pet. for Cert. 71a. TheDistrict Court determined that Sutton’s claim depended on whethershe received a timely forfeiture hearing within the meaning of$8,850. See id., at 66a–70a. The District Court ruledthat Sutton’s forfeiture hearing was timely and satisfied dueprocess, in part because Sutton never asked for an earlier hearing.See id., at 70a–71a.The U.S. Court of Appeals for the EleventhCircuit consolidated the two cases and affirmed. Culley v.Attorney General, No. 21–13805 etc. (July 11, 2022), App. toPet. for Cert. 1a–2a. The Court of Appeals agreed with the twodistrict courts that a timely forfeiture hearing affords claimantsdue process and that no separate preliminary hearing isconstitutionally required. See id., at 6a–8a. The Court ofAppeals rested its conclusion on circuit precedent, which in turnrelied on this Court’s decisions in $8,850 and VonNeumann. See ibid.Because of a conflict in the Courts of Appealsover whether the Constitution requires a preliminary hearing incivil forfeiture cases, this Court granted certiorari. See 598U.S. ___ (2023). Compare App. to Pet. for Cert. 6a–8a, withIngram v. Wayne County, 81 F.4th 603, 620 (CA62023); Krimstock v. Kelly, 306 F.3d 40, 44 (CA2 2002).[1]IIUnder the Due Process Clause of the FourteenthAmendment as interpreted by this Court, States ordinarily may notseize real property before providing notice and a hearing. SeeUnited States v. James Daniel Good Real Property,510 U.S.43, 62 (1993). But States may immediately seize personalproperty (for example, a car) that is subject to civil forfeiturewhen the property otherwise could be removed, destroyed, orconcealed before a forfeiture hearing. See Calero-Toledo v.Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S.663, 679–680 (1974).When States seize and seek civil forfeiture ofpersonal property, due process requires a timelypost-seizure forfeiture hearing. See United States v. VonNeumann, 474 U.S.242, 247–250 (1986); United States v. $8,850,461 U.S.555, 562–565 (1983). In this case, petitioners Culley andSutton do not challenge the timeliness of their forfeiturehearings. Rather, they argue that the Due Process Clause requiresStates to also hold a separate preliminary hearing before theforfeiture hearing.ACulley and Sutton argue that a preliminaryhearing is constitutionally necessary to determine whether Statesmay retain seized personal property pending the ultimate forfeiturehearing. As petitioners envision it, the preliminary hearing wouldfocus on the “‘probable validity’” of the forfeiture.Krimstock v. Kelly, 306 F.3d 40, 48 (CA2 2002) (quoting Commissioner v.Shapiro, 424 U.S.614, 629 (1976)). The preliminary hearing would be adversarial,the parties could introduce evidence and cross-examine witnesses,and property owners could raise affirmative defenses, includinginnocent ownership. In essence, the preliminary hearing would be anearlier version of the forfeiture hearing itself.Alabama and its amici, including theUnited States, disagree. They argue that a preliminary hearing isnot constitutionally required. To begin, they emphasize that mostStates and the Federal Government do not currently providepreliminary hearings in civil forfeiture cases. So requiring apreliminary hearing as a matter of constitutional dictate wouldnecessitate a major change in the States’ and the FederalGovernment’s longstanding practices. Alabama and its amicialso contend that a property owner’s post-seizure rights arealready protected by the constitutional requirement that theforfeiture hearing be timely. They further assert that requiring a“hearing before a hearing” in every case, as petitioners want,would interfere with important law-enforcement activities that mustoccur after the seizure and before the forfeiture hearing—includingidentifying and contacting potential claimants of the property;coordinating forfeiture proceedings with related criminalinvestigations and prosecutions; and ensuring that property is notremoved, destroyed, or put to illegal use before the forfeiturehearing.Ultimately, we need not reweigh the competingdue process arguments advanced by the parties because this Court’sdecisions in United States v. $8,850, 461 U.S.555 (1983), and United States v. Von Neumann,474 U.S.242 (1986), already resolved the issue. After a State seizesand seeks civil forfeiture of personal property, due processrequires a timely forfeiture hearing but does not require aseparate preliminary hearing.The dispute in $8,850 arose when theCustoms Service seized currency from an individual entering theUnited States, but then waited before filing for civil forfeitureof the currency. See 461 U.S., at 558–561. The property ownerargued that the delay violated due process. See id., at562.This Court concluded that a post-seizure delay“may become so prolonged that the dispossessed property owner hasbeen deprived of a meaningful hearing at a meaningful time.”Id., at 562–563. The Court elaborated that timeliness incivil forfeiture cases must be assessed by “analog[izing]... to a defendant’s right to a speedy trial” andconsidering four factors: the length of the delay, the reason forthe delay, whether the property owner asserted his rights, andwhether the delay was prejudicial. Id., at 564 (citingBarker v. Wingo, 407 U.S.514, 530 (1972)). Those factors are appropriate guides in thecivil forfeiture context, the Court explained, because the factorsensure that “the flexible requirements of due process have beenmet.” 461 U.S., at 564–565.In Von Neumann, the Court addressedwhether a timely forfeiture hearing, without more, provides theprocess that is due in civil forfeiture cases. See 474 U.S.,at 249–251. The property owner there failed to declare the purchaseof his new car upon driving it into the United States. Seeid., at 245. A customs official determined that the car wassubject to civil forfeiture and seized it. See ibid. Theplaintiff filed a petition for remission of the forfeiture—inessence, a request under federal law that the Federal Governmentexercise its discretion to forgive the forfeiture. See id.,at 245–246. The Government did not respond to that petition for 36days. See id., at 246. The plaintiff sued, arguing that theGovernment’s 36-day delay in answering the remission petitionviolated due process. See id., at 246–247.Justice Brennan’s opinion for the Court broadlyheld that due process did not require a pre-forfeiture-hearingremission procedure in the first place. See id., at 249–251.Citing $8,850, the Court ruled that a timely “forfeitureproceeding, without more, provides the postseizure hearing requiredby due process” to protect the plaintiff’s “property interestin the car.” 474 U.S., at 249. The Court explained that theplaintiff’s “right to a forfeiture proceeding” that meets the$8,850 timeliness test “satisfies any due process right withrespect to the car.” 474 U.S., at 251. A separate remissionhearing is not “constitutionally required.” Id., at250.[2]This Court’s decisions in $8,850 andVon Neumann resolve this case. As the Court stated in VonNeumann, a timely forfeiture hearing “satisfies any due processright” with respect to a “car” that has been seized for civilforfeiture. 474 U.S., at 251; see also id., at 249.The Due Process Clause does not require a separate preliminaryhearing.[3]Culley and Sutton’s argument for a separatepreliminary hearing appears in many respects to be a backdoorargument for a more timely hearing so that a property owner with agood defense against forfeiture can recover her property morequickly. But the Court’s precedents already require a timelyhearing, and a property owner can of course raise$8,850-based arguments in an individual case to ensure atimely hearing.Culley and Sutton (echoed by the dissent here)try to brush aside Von Neumann on the ground that thestatutory remission procedure in that case was discretionary. See474 U.S., at 244, and n. 2 (citing 19 U.S.C.§1618 (1982 ed., Supp. III)); see also post, at 8–9(Sotomayor, J., dissenting). But the discretionary nature of theremission procedure played no role in the Court’s constitutionalanalysis. See 474 U.S., at 249–251. Culley and Sutton alsotry to characterize the language in Von Neumann as dicta. Wedisagree. The Court ruled for the Government in Von Neumannon the ground that a timely “forfeiture proceeding, without more,provides the postseizure hearing required by due process” in civilforfeiture cases. Id., at 249. No separate preliminaryhearing is constitutionally required.Culley and Sutton also contend thatMathews v. Eldridge should be the test for decidingwhen additional process is due and that, under Mathews, apreliminary hearing would be required in civil forfeiture cases.424 U.S.319 (1976). But this Court decided $8,850 and VonNeumann after Mathews, yet in those two cases, the Courtdid not apply the Mathews test. In any event, there is nogood reason to think that the Mathews balancing test wouldyield a different result here. A timely forfeiture hearing protectsthe interests of both the claimant and the government. And anadditional preliminary hearing of the kind sought by petitionerswould interfere with the government’s important law-enforcementactivities in the period after the seizure and before theforfeiture hearing.In arguing that the Constitution requires apreliminary hearing, Culley and Sutton also point to this Court’sFourth Amendment decisions in the criminal context. That analogy isflawed. The Fourth Amendment requires that any person who isarrested without a warrant be brought before a neutral magistratewithin 48 hours, absent extraordinary circ*mstances. See Countyof Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S.44, 53, 56–57 (1991). But the Fourth Amendment hearings are notadversarial, and they address only whether probable cause supportsthe arrestee’s detention. See Gerstein v. Pugh,420 U.S.103, 119–122 (1975). Here, Culley and Sutton do not request amere probable cause hearing of the kind described inGerstein. Rather, they argue that the immediate seizure ofproperty requires adversarial preliminary hearings, and they assertthat those hearings must address their “affirmative defense” ofinnocent ownership. Wallace v. State, 229 So. 3d1108, 1110 (Ala. Civ. App. 2017). Culley and Sutton thereforecontend that the Due Process Clause requires more extensivepreliminary procedures for the temporary retention of property thanfor the temporary restraint of persons. The Due Process Clause doesnot demand that incongruity. See United States v.Monsanto, 491 U.S.600, 615–616 (1989).Finally, the dissent here relies heavily onUnited States v. James Daniel Good Real Property,510 U.S.43. See post, at 10. There, this Court held that thegovernment must ordinarily provide notice and a hearing beforeseizing real property that is subject to civil forfeiture. See 510U.S., at 62. The Court emphasized that real property, unlikepersonal property, “can be neither moved nor concealed” during theforfeiture process. Id., at 52–53; see also id., at56–57. That case did not purport to disturb the rule that thegovernment may seize and retain personal property, such as a car,that is subject to civil forfeiture when the property otherwisecould be removed, destroyed, or concealed before a forfeiturehearing. See id., at 57 (citing Calero-Toledo, 416U.S., at 679). And more to the point, that case did not alterVon Neumann’s holding that a timely forfeiture hearingprovides the process that is due following the immediate seizure ofpersonal property.In sum, Von Neumann held that a timelyforfeiture hearing satisfies due process in civil forfeiture cases,and $8,850 specified the standard for when forfeiturehearings are timely. Culley and Sutton have not asked the Court todiscard those precedents in this case. And those precedents makecrystal clear that due process does not require a separatepreliminary hearing before the forfeiture hearing.BHistorical practice reinforces the holdings of$8,850 and Von Neumann that due process does notrequire preliminary hearings in civil forfeiture cases.Since the Founding era, statutes have authorizedthe Government to seize personal property and hold it pending aforfeiture hearing, without a separate preliminary hearing. Forexample, the first federal forfeiture law, the Collection Act of1789, authorized the civil forfeiture of ships, goods, andmerchandise involved in suspected violations of the customs laws.See, e.g., Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, §§12, 22–24,34, 1Stat. 29, 39, 42–43, 46; see generally C. Nelson, TheConstitutionality of Civil Forfeiture, 125 Yale L. J. 2446,2464–2466 (2016). The Act’s forfeiture process began with theseizure of property by a customs collector. See,e.g., §25, 1Stat. 43. The collector then filed aforfeiture action, which a court would “hear and determine... according to law.” §36, id., at 47. Whilethat action was pending, the seized property could “remain in thecustody of the collector.” §25, id., at 43. A claimant couldalso recover the property on bond. See §36, id., at 47.The Collection Act did not require a separatepreliminary hearing before the forfeiture hearing. Rather, theforfeiture “trial” supplied the opportunity for the property ownerto challenge the collector’s case. Ibid.In 1790 and 1799, Congress revised and reenactedthe Collection Act. See Act of Mar. 2, 1799, ch. 22, 1Stat. 627;Act of Aug. 4, 1790, ch. 35, 1Stat. 145. The revised versions ofthe Act contained similar forfeiture provisions and likewise lackedanything resembling a separate preliminary hearing. See,e.g., Act of Mar. 2, 1799, §§69, 89, 1Stat. 678,695–696; Act of Aug. 4, 1790, §§49, 67, 1 Stat. 170, 176–177.Many state forfeiture statutes from the Foundingperiod similarly did not require a preliminary hearing before theforfeiture hearing. See, e.g., Act of Apr. 11, 1787,ch. 81, in 2 Laws of the State of New York Passed at the Sessionsof the Legislature Held in the Years 1785, 1786, 1787 and 1788,Inclusive pp. 514–515, 517–520 (1886); Act of Oct. 1785, ch. 14, in12 The Statutes at Large; Being a Collection of All the Laws ofVirginia, from the First Session of the Legislature, in the Year1619 pp. 46–47 (1823). For example, a New York customs statute fromthat era provided that a property owner could recover his seizedgoods by either prevailing at a forfeiture “trial” or executing a“bond” for an appraised amount. Act of Apr. 11, 1787, at 517–518.The statute did not allow property owners to challenge the validityof the seizure through a separate preliminary hearing or anysimilar procedure. See id., at 517–520.In addition, when the Fourteenth Amendment wasratified in 1868, Congress did not require preliminary hearings. In1864, for example, Congress provided that goods seized under a newrevenue law should “remain” in the “care and custody” of thegovernment “until final judgment” in a forfeiture trial. Act ofMar. 7, 1864, ch. 20, §2, 13Stat. 14, 15. Although that revenue lawprovided for bond, it did not grant property owners a right topreliminary hearings. See ibid. Similarly, in 1866, Congressrequired that goods and vessels seized under a new customs law“remain in the custody” of a customs official pending “adjudicationby the proper tribunal.” Act of July 18, 1866, ch. 201, §31,14Stat. 178, 186.Many state forfeiture laws from around the timeof the Fourteenth Amendment likewise did not provide for apreliminary hearing. For example, a New Hampshire statute requiredthat a state official “detain” personal property that was seizedfor civil forfeiture until the property was “legally disposedof” through either bond or a forfeiture trial. The GeneralStatutes of the State of New-Hampshire, ch. 249, §§3, 6–7, pp.503–504 (1867). Likewise, a Vermont statute authorized the seizureof liquor that was intended for sale, required the seizing officerto “keep” the liquor “until final action is had thereon,” andlimited the conditions in which a claimant could recover theliquor. The Revised Laws of Vermont, 1880, §3818, p. 738 (1881);see §3827, id., at 740.Petitioners and their amici do notidentify any federal or state statutes that, before the late 20thcentury, required preliminary hearings in civil forfeiture cases.To be sure, some States have recently enacted laws requiringpreliminary hearings in civil forfeiture cases. See, e.g.,Ala. Act 2021–497, p. 9; 2021 Minn. Laws pp. 2064–2065; 2017 Ill.Laws pp. 6854–6855; 2017 Wis. Laws p. 815; 2012 Colo. Sess. Lawspp. 856–857; 2001 N.C. Sess. Laws p. 1159. But those recentlaws do not support a constitutional mandate for preliminaryhearings in every State.In short, both Congress and the States have longauthorized law enforcement to seize personal property and hold ituntil a forfeiture hearing. The absence of separate preliminaryhearings in civil forfeiture proceedings—from the Founding untilthe late 20th century—is weighty evidence that due process does notrequire such hearings. Cf. United States v. Ursery,518 U.S.267, 274, 287–288 (1996); Bennis v. Michigan,516 U.S.442, 446–448 (1996); Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S., at680–690. The historical practice in civil forfeiture proceedingsthus reinforces $8,850 and Von Neumann: In civilforfeiture cases involving personal property such as cars, the DueProcess Clause requires a timely forfeiture hearing but does notrequire a preliminary hearing.*  *  *To balance the interests of the government andindividuals in civil forfeiture cases involving personal property,the States and Congress have adopted a wide variety of approaches.For example, some States require that the forfeiture hearing occurwithin a fixed period of time. Others require a jury trial. Stillothers condition civil forfeiture on a successful criminalprosecution. And a few now require preliminary hearings. See Brieffor State of Georgia etal. as Amici Curiae 5–21.Our decision today does not preclude thoselegislatively prescribed innovations. Rather, our decision simplyaddresses the baseline protection of the Due Process Clause.In civil forfeiture cases, the Due ProcessClause requires a timely forfeiture hearing, but does not require aseparate preliminary hearing. We affirm the judgment of theU.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.It is so ordered.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES_________________No. 22–585_________________HALIMA TARIFFA CULLEY, etal.,PETITIONERS v. STEVEN T. MARSHALL, ATTORNEY GENERAL OFALABAMA, etal.on writ of certiorari to the united statescourt of appeals for the eleventh circuit[May 9, 2024]Justice Sotomayor, with whom Justice Kagan andJustice Jackson join, dissenting.A police officer can seize your car if he claimsit is connected to a crime committed by someone else. The policedepartment can then keep the car for months or even years until theState ultimately seeks ownership of it through civil forfeiture. Inmost States, the resulting proceeds from the car’s sale go to thepolice department’s budget. Petitioners claim that the Due ProcessClause requires a prompt, post-seizure opportunity for innocent carowners to argue to a judge why they should retain their carspending that final forfeiture determination. When an officer has afinancial incentive to hold onto a car and an owner pleadsinnocence, they argue, a retention hearing at least ensures thatthe officer has probable cause to connect the owner and the car toa crime.Today, the Court holds that the Due ProcessClause never requires that minimal safeguard. In doing so, itsweeps far more broadly than the narrow question presented andhamstrings lower courts from addressing myriad abuses of the civilforfeiture system. Because I would have decided only which dueprocess test governs whether a retention hearing is required andleft it to the lower courts to apply that test to different civilforfeiture schemes, I respectfully dissent.IACivil forfeiture occupies a murky spacebetween criminal forfeiture and ordinary government deprivations ofproperty. Criminal forfeiture is part of a defendant’s criminalpunishment. The government must therefore proceed against theperson (in personam) to obtain someone’s property viacriminal forfeiture, which generally requires notice of intent toforfeit the property in a criminal indictment and full criminalprocedural protections for the defendant. At the outset, thegovernment must typically prove that it has probable cause to seizethe person for a specific crime and therefore to hold any propertyrelated to that crime. See Gerstein v. Pugh,420 U.S.103 (1975).Outside the criminal context, the governmentusually must provide a hearing before depriving someone ofessential property. See, e.g., Goldberg v.Kelly, 397 U.S.254, 264–266 (1970) (public assistance); Bell v.Burson, 402 U.S.535, 542–543 (1971) (driver’s license); Fuentes v.Shevin, 407 U.S.67, 96–97 (1972) (household goods to which a creditor lays aclaim). In some circ*mstances “the necessity of quick action by theState” may prevent a predeprivation hearing. Parratt v.Taylor, 451 U.S.527, 539 (1981), overruled on other grounds, Daniels v.Williams, 474 U.S.327 (1986). Then, however, the government must make“availab[le] . . . some meaningful means by which to assess thepropriety of the State’s action at some time after the initial[seizure], [to] satisfy the requirements of procedural dueprocess.” 451 U.S., at 539.Civil forfeiture is a hybrid, where prosecutorsproceed against any property (inrem) they believe isconnected to a crime, even when the owner is innocent. Unlikecriminal forfeiture, civil forfeiture proceedings are untetheredfrom any criminal prosecution. In fact, as many as 80% of civilforfeitures are not accompanied by any ultimate criminalconviction. Brief for Buckeye Institute as Amicus Curiae 14.Civil forfeiture is unnecessary where the government pursuescriminal forfeiture in an indictment and sustains a conviction.Only if an officer seizes property that he believes is connected toa crime, but does not belong to a defendant charged with thatcrime, must prosecutors bring civil forfeiture proceedings outsidea criminal case. Even when the State abandons the prosecution thatformed the basis for the seizure, an innocent property owner can beleft in civil forfeiture proceedings trying to get her propertyback.BThe Federal Government, States, and localitiesset their own rules for civil forfeiture, subject only to thelimits of the Due Process Clause. This lack of standardizedprocedural safeguards makes civil forfeiture vulnerable to abuse.In 32 States and the federal system, when law enforcement agenciesforfeit property, the proceeds go to their own budgets. Brief forInstitute for Justice etal. as Amici Curiae 4. As aresult, police agencies often have a financial incentive to seizeas many cars as possible and try to retain them. The forfeiturerevenue is not a supplement; many police agencies in fact depend oncash flow from forfeitures for their budgets. See,e.g., J. Worrall & T. Kovandzic, Is Policing forProfit? Answers From Asset Forfeiture, 7 Criminology & Pub.Pol’y 219, 222 (2008) (“[M]ore than 60% of police agencies surveyedreported dependence on asset forfeiture”). These cash incentivesnot only encourage counties to create labyrinthine processes forretrieving property in the hopes that innocent owners will abandonattempts at recovery, they also influence which laws policeenforce, how they enforce them, and who they enforce them against.See Brief for Buckeye Institute as Amicus Curiae 6–20(detailing empirical studies on the effect of fiscal incentives incivil forfeiture on law enforcement decisionmaking).Police officers have an incentive to enforce thelaw in a way that leads to the recovery of fungible property, likecash or cars. For example, officers might pose as drug dealersinstead of buyers in a sting operation, because “it allows policeto seize a buyer’s cash rather than a seller’s drugs (which have nolegal value to the seizing agency).” E. Blumenson & E. Nilsen,Policing for Profit: The Drug War’s Hidden Economic Agenda, 65 U.Chi. L.Rev. 35, 67 (1998). Similarly, police officers mighttarget low-level drug possession in cars instead of drugtransactions on the street, so that they can seize the vehicle. Inthis case, police officers pulled over petitioner Halima TariffaCulley’s college-age son while he was driving a car registered toher, charged him with possession of marijuana, and seized the car.A police officer cannot sell recovered marijuana and a prosecutor’soffice does not ordinarily pursue low-level marijuana offenses.When a police department can recover the proceeds from a carcivilly forfeited in connection to a low-level marijuana offense,however, targeting that offense becomes more appealing.Moreover, officers have a financial incentive totarget marginalized groups, such as low-income communities ofcolor, who are less likely to have the resources to challenge theforfeiture in court. See A. Crawford, Civil Asset Forfeiture inMassachusetts: A Flawed Incentive Structure and Its Impact onIndigent Property Owners, 35 Boston College J.L. & Soc.Justice 257, 274–277 (2015) (“[O]ne way for law enforcementagencies to generate profits is to target low-income parties whoare financially incapable of challenging seizures”). A 2019 studyfound that “the seizure of nonnarcotic property from black andHispanic arrestees increases with the size of the [budget] deficitin states where police departments can retain revenue from seizedproperty.” M. Makowsky, T. Stratmann, & A. Tabarrok, To Serveand Collect: The Fiscal and Racial Determinants of Law Enforcement,48 J. Legal Studies 189, 208–209 (2019).“[T]hese same groups are often the most burdenedby forfeiture,” because “they are more likely to suffer in theirdaily lives while they litigate for the return of a critical itemof property, such as a car.” Leonard v. Texas, 580U.S. 1178, 1180 (2017) (statement of Thomas, J., respecting denialof certiorari). For many people, loss of access to a car, eventemporarily, is significant. Over 85% of Americans drive to work.J. Hirsch & P. Jones, Driver’s License Suspension for UnpaidFines and Fees: The Movement for Reform, 54 U. Mich. J.L.Reform 875, 881 (2020). Unsurprisingly, studies have found a linkbetween the inability to drive and the loss of a job. For example,“[i]n New Jersey, 42% of people lost their jobs after theirdriver’s license was suspended.” Ibid. Loss of a car notonly “takes away one’s ability to commute” but also imposes abarrier to “buy[ing] necessities, access[ing] healthcare, andvisit[ing] family members, pharmacies, grocery stores, hospitals,and other essential services.” Ibid.Given these burdens, low-income communities arealso the most vulnerable to pressure from unchecked prosecutors,who can use coercive civil forfeiture processes to extractsettlement money from innocent owners desperate to get theirproperty back. See Brief for Institute for Justice etal. asAmici Curiae 19–20 (detailing examples). In Detroit, to takeone example, car owners recently alleged that Wayne County seizesvehicles in areas generally associated with crime and holds on tothe vehicles and their contents unless the owners pay steepredemption fees: $900 for the first seizure; $1,800 for the second;and $2,700 for the third. See Ingram v. Wayne Cty.,81 F. 4th 603, 606 (CA6 2023). If the owner is unwilling or unableto pay this fee, she must either abandon the vehicle or wait forcounty prosecutors to decide whether to initiate forfeitureproceedings. Before such proceedings are brought, however, theowner allegedly must attend four or more pretrial conferencesduring regular work hours, during which the owner typically willnot get to plead her case to a judge. Instead, prosecutors willattempt to persuade her to pay the redemption fee, towing costs,and storage fees. Missing just one conference allegedly will resultin automatic forfeiture and transfer of title to the county.Similarly, in Massachusetts, one investigationfound over 500 instances in a single county where law enforcementheld property for a decade or more before officials finallycommenced forfeiture proceedings. S. Datar & S. Dooling,Massachusetts Police Can Easily Seize Your Money. The DA of OneCounty Makes It Nearly Impossible To Get It Back, ProPublica (Aug.18, 2021),www.propublica.org/article/massachusetts-police-can-easily-seize-your-money.-the-da-of-one-county-makes-it-near-impossible-to-get-it-back.In other words, those owners had to wait more than a decade for thechance to explain to a judge why they should get their propertyback. In one instance, prosecutors ran a newspaper notice fouryears after a seizure, at which point the property owner had only20 days to file a claim to avoid forfeiture. Similar delays havebeen reported in South Carolina, Oklahoma, and Pennsylvania. SeeBrief for Institute for Justice etal. as Amici Curiae16 (collecting studies).In short, law enforcement can seize cars, holdthem indefinitely, and then rely on an owner’s lack of resources toforfeit those cars to fund agency budgets, all without any initialcheck by a judge as to whether there is a basis to hold the car inthe first place.IIThis Court granted certiorari to address whichof its tests should govern due process challenges that seek aretention hearing after an officer seizes a car.[1] Now, the Court reaches far beyond thatquestion to hold that people whose cars are seized by the policenever have a due process right to a retention hearing. The Courtarrives at this conclusion by relying on two customs cases from the1980s and historical practice that purportedly reinforces theirapplication. Its reasoning is deeply flawed.AThe majority says that “[t]his Court’sdecisions in $8,850 and Von Neumann resolve thiscase.” Ante, at 8. These cases, however, have little to sayabout what due process requires when an innocent owner seeks toretain her car pending an ultimate forfeiture determination inschemes like those described above. Instead, the claimants in thesecases argued that the United States Customs Service took too longto resolve forfeiture proceedings against property seized at theborder as part of the claimants’ own alleged violations of customslaw.In United States v. $8,850,461U.S. 555, 558 (1983), a customs inspector seized $8,850 in cashfrom Mary Josephine Vasquez, who had declared she was carrying lessthan $5,000. Vasquez was charged with a felony and a misdemeanor,with the indictment seeking forfeiture of the $8,850 as part of themisdemeanor charge. When a jury ultimately convicted Vasquez ofonly the felony count, which did not contain the forfeitureallegations, the Government finally filed civil forfeitureproceedings against the cash. Vasquez argued only that theGovernment’s 18-month delay in filing civil forfeiture proceedingswas unconstitutionally long. To evaluate her claim, the Courtborrowed the Barker v. Wingo multifactor test fromthe speedy-trial context and held that “the balance of factorsindicate[d] that the Government’s delay . . . was reasonable” inthe circ*mstances. 461 U.S., at 569; see id., at 564(citing Barker v. Wingo, 407U.S. 514 (1972)). In so holding, the Court emphasized that theGovernment had “diligent[ly]” pursued the pending criminalproceedings against Vasquez. 461 U.S., at 568. Because aconviction on the misdemeanor count could have rendered civilforfeiture unnecessary, the Government’s delay in filing a civilforfeiture proceeding was understandable. Ibid.In United States v. Von Neumann,474 U.S.242, 245 (1986), Von Neumann failed to declare a newlypurchased Jaguar Panther car to customs officials when he drove itback to the United States. UnitedStates Customs seized thecar, and Von Neumann filed a petition for administrative remissionproceedings the same day. Two weeks later, he posted a bond andregained possession of the car. Thirty-six days after he filed hisremission petition, Customs resolved it by reducing Von Neumann’spenalty for failure to declare to $3,600.Von Neumann argued that the 36-day delay inresponding to his administrative remission petition violated dueprocess. The Government responded that “due process considerationsdo not govern the Secretary’s disposition of [administrative]remission petitions.” Id., at 249. The Court agreed with theGovernment. “Implicit in this Court’s discussion of timeliness in$8,850 was the view that the [regular civil] forfeitureproceeding, without more, provides the postseizure hearing requiredby due process to protect Von Neumann’s property interest in [his]car.” Id., at 249. The administrative proceedings did nottrigger a separate due process right, the Court continued, becausethey were discretionary and “not necessary to a forfeituredetermination.” Id., at 250.The Court then declined to address the argumentthat the remission statute “itself creates a property right whichcannot be taken away without due process.” Ibid. “[E]ven ifrespondent had such a property right,” the Court explained, “anydue process requirement of timely disposition was more thanadequately provided here.” Ibid. The Court had “alreadynoted that his right to a forfeiture proceeding meeting theBarker test satisfies any due process right with respect tothe car and the money.” Id., at 251. Von Neumann had alsofailed to show “what prejudice [he] suffered from the 36-day delayin the response” to his remission petition. Id., at 250.The majority takes Von Neumann’simprecise categorical language out of this vital context to holdthat “a timely forfeiture hearing ‘satisfies any due process right’with respect to a ‘car’ that has been seized for civil forfeiture.”Ante, at 8 (quoting Von Neumann, 474 U.S., at251).[2] In doing so, itextends the holdings of both Von Neumann and $8,850to situations neither Court contemplated. In both, the Governmentsought to forfeit property tied to the claimants’ unlawful conduct.The claimants were not, and did not claim to be, innocent owners ofproperty used for criminal ends without their knowledge. Unlikepetitioners here, neither the claimant in $8,850 nor theclaimant in Von Neumann had argued that a retention hearingwas necessary to test Customs’ justification for seizing theirproperty at the outset. Instead, both argued only that theGovernment took too long to resolve their proceedings: in$8,850 through a statutory process, and in VonNeumann through a discretionary administrative one. Themajority’s reading here improperly resolves a constitutionalchallenge that the Court in those cases had no cause or reason toaddress.BWith the sole exception of the EleventhCircuit, every court of appeals has rejected Von Neumann’sapplication to state and county civil forfeiture schemes concerningclaimants’ cars.[3] Indeed,this Court has distinguished Von Neumann in contexts whereofficers have a financial incentive to seize property and ownersmay assert innocence of the underlying crime as a defense. InUnited States v. James Daniel Good Real Property,510 U.S.43, 46 (1993), for example, this Court held that the Governmentmust conduct a predeprivation hearing before it seizes realproperty connected to criminal conduct through civil forfeiture.Four years after James Daniel Good pleaded guilty to state chargesbased on drugs found in his home, the Federal Government filedcivil forfeiture proceedings against his home. Even though Good didnot assert innocence, the Court emphasized that proceedings withouta predeprivation hearing created an unacceptable risk of error forproperty owners asserting an “innocent owner” defense, becausewaiting until the final forfeiture hearing “‘would not curethe temporary deprivation that an earlier hearing might haveprevented.’” Id., at 56. Crucial to the Court’sreasoning was the fact that “the Government has a direct pecuniaryinterest in the outcome of the proceeding” when it is entitled toforfeit the property. Id., at 55–56.This reasoning applies directly to due processchallenges where police seize the cars of innocent owners and useforfeiture proceeds to fund department budgets. The narrow holdingsof $8,850 and Von Neumann should not determine thedue process claims of every claimant deprived of access to her carby state prosecutors on untested grounds for months or years.IIIThe majority’s categorical rule that dueprocess never requires a retention hearing also cannot be squaredwith the context-specific analysis that this Court’s due processdoctrine requires. “‘[D]ue process,’ unlike some legal rules,is not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated totime, place and circ*mstances.” Cafeteria & RestaurantWorkers v. McElroy, 367 U.S.886, 895 (1961) (alteration in original). “[D]ue process isflexible and calls for such procedural protections as theparticular situation demands.” Morrissey v. Brewer,408 U.S.471, 481 (1972).The Court granted this case to resolve which oftwo flexible due process tests should govern, not to resolvewhether due process ever requires a retention hearing in civilforfeiture schemes. That difference is important. An appropriatelycontext-specific due process test should not always yield the sameresult when applied to different schemes. Of the six Circuits thathave applied the test from Mathews v. Eldridge,424 U.S.319 (1976), to various civil forfeiture schemes, three haveheld that due process requires a retention hearing, Ingram,81 F. 4th, at 620; Smith v. Chicago, 524 F.3d 834,838 (CA7 2008), vacated as moot, Alvarez v. Smith,558 U.S.87 (2009); Krimstock v. Kelly, 306 F.3d 40, 67–68 (CA2 2002) (Sotomayor, J.), and three haveheld that it does not, Serrano v. CBP, 975 F.3d 488,500–502 (CA5 2020) (percuriam); Booker v.St. Paul, 762 F.3d 730, 736–737 (CA8 2014); UnitedStates v. One 1971 BMW, 652 F.2d 817, 820–821 (CA91981). That result is consistent with the flexible dictates of anydue process test, which should take into account all the componentparts of an individual scheme.For instance, petitioners had the right to posta bond to get back their vehicles, the right to move for summaryjudgment in the forfeiture proceeding itself, and the opportunityto seek separate relief under the Alabama Rules of CriminalProcedure for an illegal seizure. The adequacy of those alternativeprocedures was never briefed below because the only question waswhich test should apply. By contrast, the New York City scheme thatthe Second Circuit concluded violated due process lacked all ofthose procedures. See Krimstock, 306 F.3d, at 55,59–60. Differences in the adequacy of available procedures can andshould result in different due process outcomes.Instead of answering the question presented andthen remanding to the lower court to apply the appropriate test,the majority instead holds that due process never requires aretention hearing. The majority acknowledges that “the States andCongress have adopted a wide variety of approaches.” Ante,at 14. Yet it prescribes a categorical constitutional rule for allof them. The Court today hamstrings federal courts from conductinga context-specific analysis in civil forfeiture schemes that areless generous than the one here.IVThe majority’s holding relates only toretention hearings. It does not foreclose other potential dueprocess challenges to civil forfeiture proceedings. Seeante, at 8, n.3. People who have their property seizedby police remain free to challenge other abuses in the civilforfeiture system. For instance, such claimants could challengenotice of a forfeiture posted only in a newspaper, the lack of aneutral adjudicator at an initial hearing, or the standard of proofnecessary to seize a car. Lower courts remain free to applyMathews to those claims. See ante, at 9. Due processalso still “requires a timely post-seizure forfeiturehearing,” ante, at 5, so claimants may continue to challengeunreasonable delays.[4]The abuses of many civil forfeiture systems arewell documented. See, e.g., supra,at3–6. I commend States or localities that have adoptedretention hearings as a way of guarding against those abuses. See,e.g., Brief for Legal Aid Society as AmicusCuriae (detailing the benefits of New York City’s promptpostseizure hearings). Other States and localities should not viewtoday’s decision as precluding them from following suit andadopting similar measures.*  *  *The majority today holds that due processnever requires the minimal check of a retention hearing before apolice officer deprives an innocent owner of her car for months oryears. Given the diverse schemes adopted by States, some withadequate safeguards and some without, the Court should have justanswered the question presented. Instead, it announces a universalrule for all schemes without heeding the dictates of this Court’sdue process precedents that require a scheme-specific analysis.Because I instead would have answered the question presented andleft lower courts the flexibility to apply the appropriate test inthese myriad circ*mstances, I respectfully dissent.